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# M<sup>C</sup>CLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN.

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“THERE IS JUSTICE IN HISTORY.”

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## McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN.

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THE time has come to vindicate General McClellan and his campaign from the misrepresentations of political antagonists and the aspersions of ignorant critics. His enemies have concealed nothing which, by publicity or obliquity of statement could at any time do him damage, whatever was made known to the enemy that should have been secret. With proper self-poise, and the instinct and etiquette of a soldier, General McClellan has remained silent, nor furnished the facts or inspired the logic of his defence. He does well to do so. He can afford to be silent.

Our position as public journalists has kept us informed of many circumstances in the history of the campaign which are not generally known—many facts which, to have made public earlier, would have given valuable information to the enemy. The situation has now so completely changed, however, that further silence will aid the good cause less than the outspoken truth. A Michigan senator, moreover, whose personal weight or political character are not such as of themselves to give to his opinions or his statements authority, has yet, by the fact that they were uttered upon the floor of the Senate and are still assiduously circulated and endorsed by radical presses, been able to confuse the public mind, and create a distrust of its formerly favorite General. And this, too, though the President still retains him in his high command, though the best and most skillful Generals—the fighting not less than the counseling Generals—express unabated confidence in his capacity and his past management; this, too, though General Halleck whom all praise, once paralleled Manassas with Corinth, and though he, too, has the highest confidence in General McClellan; this, too, though President Lincoln now frankly acknowledges, in words, the responsibility of our failure on the peninsula, as he had previously acknowledged that of the Shenandoah valley disaster, and in acts, by retiring from the conduct of the campaign and giving the reins to the able and trained hands of the present General-in-Chief.

It is the duty, then, of those who can better inform the public judgment no longer to delay doing so. It is the duty of those whom hasty opinions have led astray to restore their confidence to General McClellan, if it shall appear that their confidence is deserved. None of us invariably succeed in the light affairs of human life, or the weighty. We have no right to demand it in detail and at all times of any General. Invariable success can be compassed by no infinite intellect, though assisted by every advantage of weapons and means. We have a right, such is our preponderance of power, to expect it of Generals in the long run, and of the Administration as the final result. But as to a movement, or a campaign, the American people have no right to demand of a General more than this: "With all the means at your command, do the very best you can." That General McClellan has done thus much his worst traducers do not deny. That no General living, in his place, could have done more or better we are firmly persuaded. And we ask attention to the facts which induce our belief.

It is needless to recite here the brilliant services and successes of the

young officer in Mexico, or to allude to his dashing campaign in Western Virginia, where the stake was small and bold risks wise. It is from the time that he was called to command the Army of the Potomac that his career is without a parallel in military history. We had no army; he was asked to create one. The rebels threatened the capital; he was asked to defend it. We had suffered defeat; he was asked to retrieve it by victories. Thousands upon thousands of unarmed men poured into Washington from the populous and aroused North—some unarmed, others half armed, some with officers, some without, and these nearly all as ignorant as their men. Arms, equipments, ammunition, clothing, shoes, food, all were lacking. The country over, foundries and furnaces were set agoing to cast cannon and shot; the powder factories were worked to their utmost capacity; every carriage factory was set to turning out artillery carriages, baggage trains, ambulance wagons; saddle and harness shops were all in requisition; and, in fine, the whole industrial force of the country was put at work to complete in the shortest time possible the vast material without which our great armies would have been helpless mobs. To the practical direction of these preparations for weeks General McClellan gave long days and sleepless nights. Was it well done? Let competent judges answer. Even his detractors speak of "the finest army of the world," forgetful who it was that made it.

When Congress adjourned in the summer it left Washington at the mercy of a force fully adequate to capture it and rout the armed rabble which panic-struck, had fled from the Stone Bridge and was then roaming through its streets and suburbs. When Congress met in December the city was safe against five times any force that could be brought against it, order had been restored, they were soldiers who were across the Potomac, and the equipment of the army was proceeding as rapidly as energy and skill could make it.

The "On to Richmond" hullabalooers—who had forced the President to his first and most fatal error, who had compelled General Scott to a movement which his judgment did not approve, and hounded the army of the Potomac on to its terrible disaster—recovering from the silence which the peril and the aroused wrath of the nation forced upon them, now began again their devilish work, and this time McClellan was the point of attack.

It is scarcely worth while to discuss all the causes of General McClellan's delay in taking the field. It is enough to say, setting aside the army's lack at that time of the thorough discipline and instruction to which it now owes its very existence; it was not, even when it left Washington, properly equipped; it was forced into the field a full month too soon—a month before it had been or possibly could be supplied with its proper material. All that depended on the General he had done; that which depended on physical laws and conditions none could control. The shops, the furnaces, the factories, had not completed their work; it was simply a physical impossibility for them to do so by the 10th, or even by the last of March. As material of different kinds was prepared, it was assigned where first needed, and the equipment of the western and southern expeditionary armies took precedence of that of his own. The demands of the whole army were large; the supply, within a limited time, wholly inadequate; and neither money, energy, nor the volleys of abuse from the *Tribune*

could remedy the matter. Time alone could supply the deficiencies, and until that time had elapsed, and the supplies were completed and delivered, the army could not be ready. An army and all its material—its instruments and equipments, not less than its skill—had to be created. One merely as good as the rebel army would not answer. It had to be larger and better, or its first campaign would have been its last. Thank God, the seven days' battles proved that we had an army.

As to the size, past and present, of that army, the figures and facts given by Senator Chandler were given not only to the country but to the enemy, who now has a solid base on which to act. His vague idea of our army of 200,000 to 250,000 men has been of great advantage to us; but that idea is now corrected, and the Senator's speech has deprived us of the advantage of concealing our numbers, or the possibility of misleading and deceiving him. Had any member of the Army of the Potomac divulged so much to the enemy as Senator Chandler has done, he would, on conviction, have been hung as a traitor and a spy, promptly and justly. It is lawful and expedient now, at any rate, to break the full effect of his indiscretion, by placing the *facts* he has presented in their natural order and connection, so that they may convey truth instead of falsehood. The consequences must fall where they belong.

General McClellan never underrated the rebellion, nor the power that must be put forth to suppress it. He knew well the strength and resources of the South, and the desperate character of its able leaders. He was never deluded by the foolish theories about a starved-out population, nor by the rosy but crack-brain visions of the *Tribune*, and other negrophilist organs, about an enthusiastic rising of "mean whites and negroes." He did not need to be persuaded that the army which won the field at Manassas, doubled in numbers and perfect in discipline, would not run away from their works at the charge of a regiment of Yankee horse, even if preceded by a thundering speech from an emancipation Senator, a diatribe from Wendell Phillips, and a first-rate editorial from Field-Marshal Greeley. He knew that he was to engage a powerful army of brave men, of the same race and blood as ourselves, ably commanded, gallantly led, and thoroughly and fanatically in earnest; men who knew they were fighting for a cause—not a faction—and that cause their independence; that these men, mistaken as they were, would fight as well as men ever fought; and that the conflict would be desperate and bloody, yet that it might be, could be, and he was determined *should be* short, sharp and decisive. His public enunciations were all to this effect, and his preparations were made accordingly.

We do not purpose here to discuss other plans which General McClellan may have submitted, or their fate. We simply take Mr. Chandler's statement that when the march to Manassas was executed, which, as the Senator truly says, was not opposed by McClellan and *his* Generals, and which turned out to be rather an absurdity, the General returned to Alexandria, and after some delay (necessary, among other things, to complete the equipment of his army) embarked for Fortress Monroe. But here the Senator gets into a mass of confusion. He tells us that the Army of the Potomac, on the 10th of March, numbered 230,000 men; that it was decided that 45,000 should be left for the defence of Washington; that the

General "divided his army," and was then "permitted" to embark with 120,000. Then the Senator produces the sworn testimony of General Wadsworth that he had under his command for the defence of Washington less than 20,000 men. All this is extraordinary arithmetic.

The Army of the Potomac is 230,000 strong. General McClellan takes 120,000 with him, and there are less than 20,000 left, although it had been decided to retain 45,000. Now the difference between 230,000 and 120,000 is 110,000; what had become of all these? It simply needs to state *all* the facts, which Mr. Chandler everywhere fails to do. His success, in every important statement, in always concealing an essential fact, is extraordinary. General McClellan's comprehension of his task was clear, as we have said. His intent was to move when he got quite ready, and to be, before moving, so thoroughly prepared that once in motion, there should be no delay from any contingency whatever, against which labor and forethought could provide. Having determined on his plan he resolved to execute it, and reap surely and swiftly its results, without giving his enemy time to guard against them. What plan he preferred, it is useless to state. Events may yet take such a turn as to make silence even now prudent.

The advance by way of the peninsula was determined on. The plan was thoroughly digested and arranged, subject only to such minor variations as circumstances might render necessary. The execution of the plan was based on the employment of a force of 160,000 men, leaving 70,000 for the defence of Washington. A portion of these were ordered from the Shenandoah to Manassas to replace Sumner's corps; nearly 20,000 men—some of them excellent artillerists, under the command of General Wadsworth—garrisoned the forts which guarded all the approaches to the city, and the remainder were within easy call. Here was the most ample protection against a much larger army than "the 40,000 rebels supplied with wooden guns," about which the Senator makes merry; and even these rebels had left the country, and were known to be beyond the Rappahannock. Where they would go, when the rebel leaders found 150,000 men advancing from Yorktown on their capital, it needed no wizard to guess.

Having thus amply provided for the safety of Washington, General McClellan left Alexandria with a well organized army of over 150,000 men under his command. He witnessed the embarkation of the larger portion of them, and then he hurried to Fortress Monroe. His intention was to advance with this body on Yorktown. The troops which were to follow—(McDowell's corps, 45,000 strong, reinforced, if necessary, by 60,000 from Sumner's corps)—were to land above Old Point, and, after certain operations were effected, to cross the Pamunkey near West Point, interpose between Richmond and the rebel army at Yorktown, and so cut off the latter, and shut them up in the peninsula, without the possibility of escape. In pursuance of this plan, the army left Fortress Monroe for Yorktown. Mr. Chandler states that there were not 10,000 rebels there; but the works were found, on actual examination, which led to a sharp action, to be strong, and the enemy present in large force. In this fact was seen the promise of the certain success of the plan, and the rapid conclusion of a campaign which would utterly destroy the enemy's main army, and give us his capital.

"Does any man doubt," triumphantly asks the Senator (speaking of



an army of 158,000 men, which at this moment General McClellan believed to be under his command), "that this army, ably handled, was sufficiently strong to have captured Richmond, and crushed the rebel army? I think not, if promptly led against the enemy; but, instead of that, it sat down in malarious swamps, and awaited the drafting, arming, drilling, and making soldiers of an army to fight it, and in the meantime our own army was rapidly wasting away." General McClellan, for one, did not doubt for an instant, the absolute certainty of first "crushing" the enemy's army, and then occupying his capital speedily, and with little loss. His confidence could be seen in every movement by those near him, by all who were in the secrets of the campaign, and this feeling was shared by all around him.

The execution of the plan of General McClellan had now been fairly commenced, and it was too late to revise it. The first action had been fought, and the main body of the army stood ready and anxious to execute their part. *Yet that very evening, within one hour after the last gun had been fired, without any previous notice whatever, General McClellan received by telegraph the astounding intelligence that McDowell's corps, nearly one-third of his army—the troops on which the vital operation of the campaign depended—had been detached from his army, and were no longer under his command!* The execution of his plans was thus very effectually thwarted; yet, as if still further to embarrass him, General Wool, with his command, including Fortress Monroe and the country up to Hampton Creek, was also withdrawn from his control. Can it be wondered at, that, in the words of the Senator, "instantly General McClellan began to telegraph for reinforcements, and continued to telegraph up to the day when he was attacked by the rebels?" What else could he do but this, unless it were to resign; and would the country have forgiven him for that? Yet this is the man whose patriotism has been called in question; who, without one word of public or private complaint, has still stuck to his post, and labored as untiringly as at the beginning, when nothing was plainer than that, when that order came, either his patriotism or his pride and reputation must pass under a cloud. Was his choice a noble one?

The army was now in a false position; the plans and objects of the General were, by the nature of the case and the delay, made manifest to the enemy, in the very act which deprived him of the means of executing them. The works were closely examined. It was found the success of a general assault would be doubtful, the sacrifice of life so enormous, as to cripple his reduced army for further operations, even if it should succeed, and the flank movement, which would have made the position untenable, was now impossible.

Two courses only remained to him: to abandon the peninsula or to besiege the works. Of the two evils the latter was the less, and was adopted, and hence the necessity for that unfortunate "ditching," over which the Senator groans. It was the first fruit of the panic, real or simulated, which was raised in Washington as soon as General McClellan left, and made the pretext for depriving him of one-third of his army, rendering the result doubtful, and entailing, under any circumstances, an enormous mortality either by disease or the sword.

But the "incessant telegraphing" produced some effect! Yes; one of McDowell's divisions—that of Franklin—was sent down to him, but it was unnecessary for siege purposes and too feeble to do the work of the whole corps; so it was useless, as all half measures are—except, perhaps, to replace the number of men sacrificed in the siege.

About the same time, perhaps, by the way of filling General McClellan's telegraphic demands, or perhaps further to secure Washington, orders were issued stopping *recruiting*; and suggestions were even made that a part of the army might be disbanded as unnecessary! Senator Wilson has denied his complicity with this scheme, but the *Congressional Globe* and the telegrams at the time from our own reporter prove his denial a falsehood. The siege was prosecuted to a successful termination, and on the 4th day of May the enemy did that which, had sixty thousand men appeared at West Point, he would have done by the 15th of April in a desperate attempt to save himself—he abandoned his works. But he had delayed us a month, discovered our plans, collected his forces, and fortified his capital; and on the 5th (by which time, had the original plan not been interfered with, Virginia would have been cleared of the rebel troops and our army in possession of Richmond and even Raleigh) the battle of Williamsburg was fought.

As soon as the works were abandoned, General McClellan started his troops in pursuit—not a moment was lost, and he brought the enemy to bay at Williamsburg and defeated him. He sent a dispatch to the Secretary of War that night, stating that he had already arranged for movements up the York River; that Johnson was in front of him in strong force, probably greater than his own; but "I will at least run the risk of holding them in check here while I resume the original plan;" and concludes, "I will do all I can with the force at my disposal." Mr. Chandler, after quoting this dispatch, indulges in one of the absurdities that men generally commit when discussing matters they do not understand, and breaks out with, "He would try to hold them in check! He could not hold them. He could not stop his eager troops from chasing them." The honorable Senator does not seem to be aware that to hold a flying enemy in check he must be followed closely, and attacked fiercely, as the Confederates were followed and attacked on this occasion. In the meantime, Franklin was sent up the river to West Point, to intercept them, "in pursuance of the original plan." A bloody battle took place, but we were too feeble here, as at all other points. It was a desperate and gallant attempt to accomplish the "original plan" with an inadequate force. It resulted in still further weakening the army. Still he continued to telegraph, and, as ever, a deaf ear was turned to his demands.

The army then concentrated at the White House, advanced to the Chickahominy, and a portion of it was boldly thrown across the stream on the line of the railroad, the bridges of which had to be repaired to be made available; and now the awkwardness and danger of our position, due solely to the cause we have named, were made manifest.

The telegraphic dispatches, which he continued to send "up to the day he was attacked by the rebels," were still unheeded, and our army found itself in presence of one of equal or superior force, strongly intrenched, backed by a city which relieved it of all its sick and wounded, their at-

tendants and guards, and having perfect freedom of movement; while we were surrounded by traitors and spies, who could and did keep the enemy informed of all our movements. It was absolutely necessary, in order to hold our position, to keep a large portion of our force north of the Chickahominy, thus extending and weakening our lines. The difficulties of an attack were much the same as at Yorktown, with the certainty of being outnumbered at any given point, from the shorter interior lines of the enemy, his greater facilities of communication and consequent power of concentration. But we were favored in our defensive position by the enemy's exaggerated idea of our numbers. With no strong position, and no organized force to fall back upon, it was certain that without a larger army a general assault would be ruinous, unless completely successful. Under these circumstances, to attack, with all the chances against us, would have been criminal in the highest degree; an act of folly and of madness for which, had the issue been unfortunate, no atonement could have been made. With the ruin of the army, the cause itself would have been greatly endangered, if not lost. It then became necessary, indispensable, to the safety of the army to form an intrenched camp, which, in case of a reverse, would serve as a refuge and rallying point. This is the recognized and only course, that an army, deficient in numbers, can pursue under such circumstances. Hence, as a hard alternative, not from choice, "digging ditches" was again resorted to by General McClellan. It was an unavoidable consequence of taking away his troops in the first place, and the continued refusal to comply promptly with the demands of his telegraphic dispatches.

In the meantime all that could be done was effected, and the brilliant affair of Hanover Court House, and the destruction of the enemy's communications on the Central Railroad, was undertaken and effected by the troops on the north of the Chickahominy, led by the gallant General Fitz John Porter. This rendered an advance toward Washington by way of Fredericksburg impossible to the rebel army, and removed the last shadow of excuse for still withholding General McDowell's army from General McClellan. It is said that his advanced guard was within "the sound of the enemy's cannon" at Hanover. Had he advanced, or been under McClellan's orders, we might possibly have entered Richmond then, but special measures had been taken to prevent McDowell, under any circumstances, from being subject to McClellan's orders:—and still reinforcements were withheld.

On the last day of May, taking advantage of a rise in the Chickahominy, which cut off the communication between its banks, the enemy threw his whole force on our left wing at Fair Oaks. Our works were as yet imperfect, but the advantage of the defensive over the offensive where the lines of attack are few and difficult was here, as in the subsequent battles, made evident. The event showed what would have been the result of a headlong attack by our army on the enemy's stronger and better manned positions, and made obvious to all but the wilfully blind the wisdom of McClellan's course. The attack was repulsed, and the Confederates beaten back with enormous loss. Our force also suffered terribly, and was too small to follow up the success. Had we done so and attacked him in his chosen positions, the tables would have been turned upon us.

Now at last some attention was paid to the telegraphic dispatches, and General Wool's command was placed under McClellan's orders. It furnished some 6,000 men—not enough to repair our losses at Fair Oaks. At a later period another of McDowell's divisions, that of McCall, numbering some 8,000 or 10,000 men, was also sent; it scarcely made good the "sacrifice of men in the swamps of the Chickahominy." Had these forces been sent in time they might have made the victory at Hanover decisive, or enabled us to follow up the success at Fair Oaks; but they had been withheld too long, and they came too late.

Jackson's raid into the valley of the Shenandoah followed. Its object—palpable to the whole army, and stated explicitly in his instructions—was *to prevent McClellan being reinforced*. "This will be greatest service you can render to your country," were the emphatic words used by the Confederate commander, *who was simply bent upon securing a continuance of the policy already adopted at Washington toward McClellan*.

The effects of this expedition are too well known and too discreditable to be dwelt upon. The raid itself would never have taken place if McClellan's demands had been complied with; the Confederates would not have dared to detach him, nor would there have been any object to gain by doing so. The true position for the defence of Washington and of Northern Virginia was in the immediate front of Richmond, and this raid was another of the consequences of weakening McClellan's army. The fright it occasioned caused a levy *en masse* in some of the Northern States, and troops began to pour into Washington. Now at least large reinforcements could have been promptly sent. Jackson on the retreat, all the force on the Potomac might be relieved and their places filled by the new levies. But, alas! the panic over, the orders for new troops were countermanded, and McDowell—who, we are credibly informed, had been at last *promised*, instead of being sent toward Richmond, which would have enabled him surely and certainly to intercept Jackson, form a junction with McClellan, and destroy the enemy's army in detail—was sent off in the opposite direction to unite with the four other Major-Generals, who, at the heads of their respective armies, were engaged in writing accounts of their latest victories, or dreaming of future ones, while Jackson was hurrying down to join the already superior forces of Lee in a combined and overpowering attack on McClellan.

Then followed events of which McClellan and his army may be justly proud. The enemy had rendered the approaches to Richmond from the north and east by our small force almost impossible. There remained no chances for attacking him on any terms that could give hope of success except by the northeast. The road passed through a country which the Confederates considered impassable for cannon, and upon which but few works had been erected. The result would depend in a great degree upon the rapidity with which the enemy could mass his forces in that direction. General McClellan's attention had been earnestly directed to this route, private letters told us that the ground had been reconnoitered, and dispatches to the press said that the recent dry weather had done much toward making the country passable. Measures had been taken for a sudden moving of our base to the James River, should it become necessary; but the lingering hope of being reinforced

probably detained General McClellan till the last moment on the Chick ahominy. On the 26th of June the Confederates made an unsuccessful attack on Mechanicsville. After repulsing them at this point, the known approach of Jackson caused all our disposable force to be assembled at Gaine's Mill to give him battle. For five long hours twenty-five thousand men, all that could be spared from the lines, resisted the onset of fifty thousand Confederates with success; but toward night a great accession of force swelled their numbers to seventy thousand, and it required all the reinforcements that could possibly be spared from other points to hold our ground. During the night the whole army was quietly withdrawn, crossed the river, and destroyed the bridges behind them. The enemy, thrown off the trail, moved down the river, and until afternoon dense masses could be seen crossing the river above to join in the pursuit to the White House.

The enemy was out-generaled, and that night our troops were withdrawn from their works, and took the road to James River, turning fiercely on their foes ("who endeavored to hold them in check") at every favorable position, and so covered the movement of our enormous trains and stores. Battles succeeded battles, and in the intervals of conflict our troops, *successful in every engagement*, pursued their march until the "week of battles" was crowned by the victory of Malvern Hills, and the army saved. The whole series of operations was conducted with masterly skill, and nothing could be more admirable than the behavior of the troops. In the steadiness, accuracy, and promptitude with which great masses were handled and manœuvred, could be traced the direct effects of the "idle reviews" to which, day by day, the different corps had been accustomed in Washington.

Notwithstanding the bitter disappointment of the Confederates, who, in view of their enormous superiority of numbers and freedom of action reasonably anticipated the total destruction of our army, they knew how to do justice to their enemy, and while an American Senator ignorant of war, was employed in villifying and traducing McClellan on the floor of the Senate, the head of the rebel-government, himself a soldier, in open admiration, declared that with the exception of the retreat of Moreau through the Black Forest—a retreat upon which, more than upon any of his victories, rests his great fame as a General—the operations of McClellan furnished the most magnificent example which modern history presents of the rescue of a great army from apparent ruin.

After reaching Harrison's Landing, and three days after the battle of Malvern Hills was fought, Shields' division was sent to the peninsula, too late again for any earthly use except to supply the places of those whom their presence in proper time would have saved. These troops and all the reinforcements previously received, formed part of the 158,000 men whom Mr. Chandler would have us believe were always under General McClellan's control, and for the misapplication of which he is so violently assailed.

Mr. Chandler further says that McDowell's troops, also, "were to have been sent him." Why were they *not* sent? and in time to save the campaign, and the blood and treasure that must now be poured out like water, because they were *not* sent?



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But that Wool's and McCall's, and Shields Dowell's "were to have been sent," is a com policy that originally withdrew them from tained them so long against his earnest and Washington was as safe when they were withdrawn—apparently a great deal safer than when they were retained. If they could be spared at any time, they could have been spared in April. But they were withdrawn when the act sacrificed the whole campaign, and were restored when it was too late to be of any use.

It will be seen by a consideration of the facts stated by Mr. Chandler, and here presented in their true light and proper connection, that the failure of this campaign, the profitless expenditure of hundreds of millions of treasure, and of tens of thousands of lives, were due, not to any want of capacity, nor courage, nor energy, nor forethought of General McClellan; nor of discipline, nor labor, nor bravery, nor devotion on the part of his troops; but that they were the direct, natural and necessary result of the suicidal policy which deprived the General-in-Chief of a part of his command, and transferred the control of our armies and the conduct of the war to an irresponsible committee and an incompetent civilian.

So long as our armies were under one military head, and those of the rebels were directed by their War Office and its influences in Richmond, we were favored with a continued and unbroken series of victories. The rebels took warning, and established the office of Commander-in-Chief. While they were doing this, a powerful faction was at work to reverse the process with us. Our Commander-in-Chief was, amid the triumphant rejoicings of the Conspirators, deprived of his position, and his duties were transferred to our War Office and its influences. The results of this change of policy on both sides have shown themselves all over the country.

But whatever have been the errors into which the President has suffered those under him to be led, he has only needed to see them plainly to apply a remedy. His heart, at least, is in the right place. His worst enemy has not accused him of any controlling emotion save the purpose to do all in his power for the good of the country. The failures have taught him the errors of the past twelve months. General Halleck has assumed the military conduct of the war. The plans of the campaign which are now determined upon, will not be botched by an incompetent Secretary or a meddling committee. General McClellan will get strength instead of weakness through the wire which connects his headquarters with the War Office, and we reveal no more than the country has a right to know, when we say that combinations have been formed, plans already set on foot and approaching their crisis, which will vindicate the wisdom of President Lincoln in his last act, and the masterly ability of General McClellan in his past campaign and in the new one now begun.

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